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The Value of Ecological and Economic Information In Water Quality Management 
 
Beginning with Weitzman’s [1974] article on the choice between price and quantity 
controls under uncertainty, it has been recognized that the ranking of environmental policy 
instruments under uncertainty generally differs from the ranking with perfect information, given 
asymmetric information about pollution abatement costs.  However, there is surprisingly little 
empirical research on the merits of alternative instruments under uncertainty.  This research 
empirically compares the performance of price and quantity instruments for reducing nitrogen 
pollution from agriculture under uncertainty.  In addition, it explores the value of alterative types 
of information for improving the performance of nitrogen pollution control instruments.   
Imperfect information about costs and benefits of water quality protection can greatly 
complicate policy decisions to protect and restore water resources.  This has become very 
apparent to water quality managers in the U.S. in recent years, as they have struggled to comply 
with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) 
regulations.  The 1972 Clean Water Act is credited with reducing discharges from point sources 
and improving water quality.   However, significant water quality problems remain in many 
regions of the nation, often because measures were not taken to reduce pollution loads from 
nonpoint sources (NPS), such as agriculture, urban developments and atmospheric deposition.  
The major initiative to remedy the nation’s water quality problems is the EPA’s TMDL program.   
TMDL regulations require states to list waters that are not meeting water quality criteria.  For 
each listed water body, the states must identify the amount by which pollution loads from 
different sources must be reduced to meet the standards, and to develop and implement plans to 
achieve the load reductions [US EPA 2000].  The states were to accomplish this task in 8 to 13   3
years.   However, in July 2001, the U.S. EPA announced a delayed in the implementation of the 
Total Maximum Daily Load final rulemaking for 18 months [Pianin 2001]  because of the 
enormous problems states were encountering in meeting the mandate.  The slow progress has 
been attributed in large degree to the fact that key information for assessing the conditions of 
streams, lakes, and estuaries, developing sensible plans to restore impaired waters was 
unavailable and costly to obtain [NRC 2000].      
There is now great interest in more comprehensive watershed based approaches that 
address the diverse set of stressors on water quality that pursue water quality goals and balance 
costs and benefits [USDA and US EPA 1998, NRC 2000].  Achieving these ends requires a 
much broader set of information than traditional approaches have, and because much of the 
necessary information will be imperfect, decision-making under uncertainty will be unavoidable. 
In this paper we examine how imperfect information of various types may influence the 
design and performance of instruments for water quality protection, and the value of investments 
to improve information for environmental policy design.  This study is based on an empirical 
analysis of nitrogen pollution load management in the Pennsylvania portion of the Susquehanna 
River Basin (SRB).  The 27.5 thousand square mile of SRB provides 50 percent of the water 
flows into one of the most valuable natural resources in the US - the Chesapeake Bay.  The 
Bay’s nutrient pollution problems are well documented [SRB Commission 1998, Abler et al., 
2002, Chesapeake Bay Program 1999].  Agricultural nonpoint sources are major contributors to 
nitrogen loads in the SRB and Chesapeake Bay.   
The following issues are investigated: (1) the performance of alternative policy 
instruments for nitrogen pollution control under alternative information structures; and (2) the 
value of different types of information for instrument performance.  We analyze three aggregate   4
types of uncertainty in watershed management: asymmetric information about pollution 
abatement costs, imperfect knowledge about pollution transport, and imperfect information about 
environmental damage costs.  In developing numerical economic and biophysical model of the 
region and representing the uncertainties, we utilize data from readily available literature 
sources.  That is, we reproduce the cheap (minimal) ex ante information on hand of the policy 
makers.   
 
Methodology 
The optimal economic design of a particular instrument maximizes the expected 
economic surpluses accruing to consumers, producers, and resource suppliers less environmental 
damage costs, subject to the distribution of farmers’ responses to the policies being evaluated.  
Building on the model of Shortle et. al. [1998], assume a particular resource (e.g., a bay) is 
damaged by a single residual (e.g., nitrogen).  Economic damages, D, are an increasing function 
of the ambient concentration of the residual, a, i.e. D(a, η) with D’ > 0, where η is a vector of 
imperfectly known environmental and economic parameters. Ambient pollution depends on 
loadings from agricultural nonpoint sources, gi ( i = 1, 2, …, n), i.e, a = a(g1, g2, …, gn).  
Loadings depend on a vector of variable inputs, xi, and imperfectly known site-specific 
characteristics influencing fate and transport of pollution (e.g., instream-loss parameters), ωi.  
The relation for site i is gi = gi(xi, ωi).   
Let πi(xi, δi) denote the economic returns to the ith farm, restricted on the vector of farm 
input use, x, and a vector of farm-specific characteristics, δ (e.g., the farmer’s management 
ability).  We assume that producers operate on competitive input and output markets, and take 
input and output prices as given.   The vector of agricultural practice parameters, δ, is only   5
private knowledge, i.e. management decision is made under asymmetric information.  Given this 
specification, the expected social surplus is  
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where the expectation operator E utilizes the planner’s distributions of the unknown parameters.   
We analyze the performance of two environmental policy instruments, price and quantity 
controls, applied to agricultural input use.  For nonpoint sources, input-based instruments are of 
particular interest because the monitoring the contributions of individual farms to nonpoint 
source loads is prohibitively costly [Shortle and Horan 2001; Ribaudo et. al. 1999].  The ex ante 
optimal quantity controls (xi*) solves:  
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An optimal price control (e.g., tax/subsidy scheme) (ti*) maximizes the expected social surplus 
(1) contingent on polluters’ responses to the policy given their privately held information. 
Specifically, let  
} ) , ( { max arg ) , ( i i i i i
x
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− = π δ  for all i = 1, …, n      ( 3 )  
where xi is a vector of agricultural inputs in ith watershed, and ti is a vector of taxes/subsidies 
applied to input subset which directly influences pollution runoff (e.g., land and fertilizer).  The 
optimal tax/subsidy scheme maximizes (2) subject to (3).   
Given asymmetric information about pollution abatement costs, the ranking of the 
policy mechanisms will generally differ, with the results depending on properties of the 
underlying profit and damage costs functions [e.g., Weitzman 1972, Wu 2000].  The difference 
in the expected social surplus between price and quantity controls is expressed   6
as 0
>
< = − = ∆ x t tx J J , where the Jt refers to expected value of the price control, and Jx is the 
expected value of the quantity control.   ∆tx may be positive of negative.   
Policy performance can be improved by collecting additional information to reduce or 
eliminate uncertainty about pollution control costs or benefits.  The expected improvement in 
policy performance due to data gathering is the value of information.  Since information 
collection is costly and the budget available for data collection is often limited, the value of 
information can help to target investment in research.  For example, if the value of abatement 
cost information is higher than the value of other data types, and the costs are relatively low, 
collecting the control cost information can be the priority research direction.  The data collection 
priorities are set before the actual data are gathered, and the expected effect of information on 
policy performance should be estimated.  That is, the maximum social surplus should be 
calculated for every possible outcome of data collection, and then the results should be averaged 
given the probability of alternative findings.  Hence, the value of information is the difference 
between the expected ex post and ex ante social surplus
1.  For example, the expected value of 
perfect information about δ under the quantity control is  
( ) () [ ]
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x
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where the first term is the expected value of the optimal instrument contingent on realizations of 
δ, and the second term is the expected value of the decision without information (see (2)).  
The value of information is contingent on the policy instrument.  For example, given 
perfect information about pollution abatement costs, the optimized  price and quantity 
mechanisms would perform the same: ∆tx = 0 if δ is known.   Accordingly, the value of perfect 
                                                 
1 We assume that perfect information about each of the imperfectly known parameter is expected to be collected.  
That is, there is the true value of the parameter is revealed.     7
information on producers will be greater for the instrument that provides the lesser expected 
social surplus value without that information. 
SRB Model   
The empirical analysis is conducted using a model that simulates pollution control costs, 
pollution transport, and pollution damage costs in 8 subwatersheds of the SRB.  The 
subwatersheds are based on the classification used in the PA State Water Plan.  The plan 
identifies 12 subwatersheds (see Figure 1 and Table 1).  Of this twelve, watersheds 223, 404 and 
410 are dropped from this work because their nonpoint source loadings are negligible (see Table 
1).  Watershed 401 is combined with watershed 301, since the watersheds individually have 
negligible loading but lie in the interior of the SRB.   
We focus on nitrogen pollution loads from corn production.  Corn production is the major 
source of nitrogen loading in the SRB, accounting for 30% of total nitrogen loadings delivered to 
surface water.  This percentage rises even higher (approximately 67%) if atmospheric deposition 
is excluded [Abler et. al. 2002]
2.  We model nitrogen loads as functions of nitrogen application 
and/or corn acreage in each subwatershed, and consider policy instruments that target these 
inputs.   
Pollution control costs  
Corn production in each subwatershed is modeled as a single aggregate firm.  To 
facilitate our focus on nitrogen and land use choices, consider the restricted profit function, 
where all agricultural inputs are contingent on fertilizer and land use:  
  () ( ) i i i i i i i i i l r n w p l n f r w p l n ⋅ − ⋅ − = ρ ρ π , , , , , , , ,        ( 5 )    
                                                 
2 Nonpoint sources are the leading cause of pollution in SRB and Chesapeake Bay [Chesapeake Bay Program 1999], 
and pollution from corn production is roughly 81% of all nonpoint nutrient loads [Carmichael  and Evans 2000].   8
where ni is nitrogen fertilizer applications to corn, li is land in corn, ρ is the fertilizer price, ri is 
the land rental price, p is the corn price, w is the price vector for other inputs, and i indexes 
subwatersheds.  Producers operate on competitive input and output markets, and all input prices 
except land are fixed.  Land price is determined on a regional market.   
The true functional form of profit  () ⋅ i π  is unknown by the regulator.  For this analysis, 
we assume that the regulator approximates the function f(.) by a second-order Taylor series 
expansion about observed baseline values for fertilizer and land use: 
i i i i i i i i i
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where  j 0 π  is baseline profit from corn production in the i-th watershed,  i i i and , , Ω θ β  are Taylor 
expansion coefficients, and  and oi io ln are the baseline levels of land and fertilizer use
3.  
Assuming that the baseline values (, ) oi oi ln are profit-maximizing choices (i.e.  0 = ∂ ∂ i i n π  
and 0 = ∂ ∂ i i l π ), the parameters of this expression are given by  
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where  li ε is the elasticity of land demand,  ni ε is the elasticity of nitrogen demand,  nli ε  is the 
cross-price elasticity, and the prices are set at their baseline values.  To reflect regulator’s 
                                                 
3 For the baseline values we use a five year average   9
uncertainty about privately known production/abatement practices of polluters, the elasticity 
values are modeled as random variables.  The coefficients βi, θi , and Ω i  vary accordingly.   
  The opportunity costs of corn land in each subwatershed are increasing in the amount of 
land.  The true form of the land supply function is unknown by the regulator.  A first-order 
Taylor approximation is used to approximate land supply in the neighborhood of baseline land 
use: 
) r r ( l l oi i i oi i − γ + ≅            ( 1 0 )  
where coefficient  i γ  depends on the land supply elasticity (εlsi ).  
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Again, to reflect decision-maker’s uncertainty, the privately-known land supply elasticity is 
modeled as a random variable, which determine actual slope of land supply  i γ  in each 
subwatershed.  The rent accrued by land suppliers can be computed as the difference between the 
revenues and the integral of the land marginal products:  
() ∫ ⋅ − =
i l
a
i i i i i dz z r l r R γ ,          ( 1 2 )  
where the low limit of integration a is the level of land supply for which land rental price equals 
zero.   
   10
Pollution transport  
The mean annual nitrogen load from corn land to the mouth of watershed i is modeled as 
a function of nitrogen concentration in runoff, agricultural land area, and mean annual 
precipitation
4: 
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where  gi is the expected annual load to the mouth of the watershed i;  zi is mean annual 
precipitation; ϕ1i, ϕ2i, and ϕ3i are regression coefficients; Ai is scaling (calibration) coefficient; Nc 
is nitrogen concentration in the agricultural runoff.  Nitrogen concentration Nc is estimated as the 
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here µi is a calibration coefficient.   
Only a portion of deliveries to surface waters in each subwatershed ultimately reaches the 
Chesapeake Bay, which is chief area of concern for policy purposes.  The portions of deliveries 
in the i-th watershed that ultimately reach the Bay are modeled with constant delivery 
coefficients  i ω , so that total delivered nitrogen loads from corn production to the Bay are: 
. ∑ =
i i ig s ω             ( 1 5 )  
To reflect imperfect knowledge about pollution transport processes, transport coefficients 
ωi are random variables. Their means and variances are based on U.S. Geological Survey’s 
SPAtially Referenced Regressions On Watershed attributes (SPARROW) model [US Geological 
Survey 2000].   
                                                 
4 For details see [Abler et. al. 2002]   11
Damage costs 
The mean annual damage from SRB nitrogen loads to the Chesapeake Bay is 
modeled as a convex increasing function of the total nitrogen load: 
τ ψ s D ⋅ =             ( 1 6 )  
where  D is economic damage, ψ  is a coefficient, τ is elasticity of damage function, and 
0 , 0
2 2 > ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ s D s D .  The function integrates the biophysical responses of the water system 
to nitrogen load and economic valuations of the changes in water system services due to 
pollution.  Both biophysical processes in water system and social factors affecting ecosystem 
valuation are complex and not perfectly understood.  To reflect the regulator’s imperfect 
knowledge about environmental damage, both parameters ψ  and τ are random variables. 
 
To estimate the effect of information collection on the policy performances and the value 
of information, we model five information scenarios.  For the first scenario (scenario a)), we 
compare policies designed with the baseline information.  For the next four scenarios, we 
analyze the expected improvements in the performances of the policies designed with 
information about producers’ profits/control costs (β,  θ,  Ω, and γ) (scenario b)); pollution 
transport processes (ω) (scenario c)); environmental damage (ψ and τ) (scenario d)); and all the 
above (scenario e)).   
  
Modeling uncertainty 
There has been little research on the structure of agricultural production and 
agricultural land markets in SRB, and the region does differ substantially from other regions of 
the US.  Accordingly, beyond the restrictions imposed by economic theory, there is substantial   12
ignorance about the corn production and land parameters.  We utilize uniform distributions for 
these parameters.  The range of possible realizations is based on the literature for other regions 
[Hertel 1996, Abebe et. al. 1989, Roberts and Heady 1982, Vroomen and Larson 1991] (see 
Table A2).  We also use a uniform distribution for the damage cost parameters.  The studies of 
damages from nitrogen load in the Chesapeake Bay mostly concentrate on ecological effects of 
pollution without considering economic consequences [Sims and Coale 2002].  Limited 
economic studies focus on specific well-defined services of the water system (e.g., angling) or 
pursue site-specific case-studies [e.g., Kirkley et al 1999, Bockstael et al 1995].  For this 
analysis, the range of the possible values for the damage cost parameters is selected in such a 
way that the model solutions reproduce the optimal loads defined in the Chesapeake Bay 
agreement and by USGS (40% – 20% load reduction from the baseline values; Belval and 
Sprague 1999, Chesapeake Bay Program 2000).  The range of marginal damage elasticity (i.e., 
exponent of the damage function) τ is selected to reflect both elastic and inelastic marginal 
damages.  
In contrast to the lack information for assessing abatement costs and damage costs, 
there has been substantial research on the transport of nitrogen in the SRB.  We use pollution 
transport coefficients based on the USGS SPARROW model [Abler et. al. 2002, Carmichael and 
Evans 2000].  The coefficients are normally distributed.  
The model is computed using the constrained optimization procedure (CO) in 
GAUSS 3.22 (Advanced Mathematical and Statistical System; Aptech 2003).  The terms in the 
expression for the expected social surplus (1) are highly nonlinear with respect to the uncertain 
parameters, which makes it difficult to compute the expected value of the social surplus 
analytically.  A Monte Carlo procedure was used to calculate the expected value as a sample   13
mean of the function [Rubinstein 1981].  We compute the expected social surplus (1) as a sum of 
the social surplus values for randomly drawn values of the uncertain parameters divided by the 
total number of draws M: 
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For the baseline information scenario (a), the policy performance is computed by maximizing the 
ES (17) with respect to the policy choices x* or t* subject to the farmers’ responses to the 
policies (3): 
ES J
x x 8 1,...,
* max =             ( 1 8 )  
For the other information scenarios (b – e), we calculate the expected social surplus as an 
average of the optimal performances of the policies designed with information.  For example, the 
expected policy performance for the scenario with abatement cost, transport, and damage cost 
information is: 
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where j indexes randomly drawn values of abatement cost parameters. 
We select the sample size M based on two criteria: 1) to produce the results which do 
not depend on the sample size, and 2) to guarantee that the differences among results for 
alternative policy instruments and information scenarios are statistically significant.  For the 
baseline information scenario (a), six sample sizes were analyzed: M = 100, 200, 500, 1000, 
1500, and 3000.  The discrepancy between the results for M = 1500 and M = 3000 was less than 
1%.  We choose the sample size M = 1500 for all scenarios.  Then,  for the scenarios (b) through 
(d), we calculate the 95% confidence intervals as the mean of the optimal ES values plus/minus 
the product of the estimated standard deviation sM  and the t-value [Lane 2001]:   14
M M s t J J s t J ⋅ + ≤ ≤ ⋅ −
* * * * * * .  We find no overlaps in the confidence intervals, and hence, the 




The simulation results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.  Table 1 reports the expected 
net benefits, i.e. the expected increase in social surplus from imposing regulation in comparison 
with the  no-regulation case.  Table 2 summarizes the value of information for alternative 
policies.  Both tables present results for various information sets that might be held by the policy 
maker.  The baseline information column means that the policy maker is unsure about the values 
of fate and transport variables, cost variables, and damage variables (scenario a)).  The results in 
the second column are for the case in which the regulator has information on pollution transport, 
but the rest of the variables are still uncertain as in column 1 (scenario b)).  The third column is 
for the case in which the regulator has perfect information about all abatement cost parameters 
(while other parameters remain uncertain), meaning that there is no longer any asymmetric 
information between firms and the regulator.  Prices and quantity controls perform equivalently 
in this scenario (scenario c)).  The fourth column is for the case in which the regulator has 
perfect information about damage cost parameters (while other parameters remain uncertain, so 
that asymmetric information again persists in this case) (scenario d)).  Finally, the last column 
represents the case in which the regulator has perfect information about all parameters in the 
model.  Again, there is no asymmetric information in this case and the two policies produce 
equivalent outcomes (scenario e)).  
Given the baseline information, input taxes outperform the input quantity control by $3.4   15
million (22.9%) (see Table 1).  The difference between the instruments decreases for other 
information scenarios; however, for all information scenarios, price regulation performs no 
worse than the quantity control. Under a quantity control policy, firms are unable to make 
adjustments in their production and pollution control choices.  In contrast, firms are able to 
adjust their choices to their own benefit under a price policy.  Also, damages could be increased 
or decreased due to this adjustment.  So the firms' adjustments could cause either an ex ante gain 
or loss relative to the quantity control policy, in either case creating ex ante differences in net 
benefits under the two policies.  Weitzman's results indicate that whether or not the regulator 
expects the adjustments to produce a net gain or loss depends on the variance of impacts to 
damages and firm profits.  Building on this intuition, the price controls are expected to produce 
greater social surplus in our model because the benefits of increased variability, in terms of 
expected producer profits, outweigh the costs of increased variability, in terms of expected 
damages
5. 
Information collection improves the expected performance of both policies.  However, 
the improvement depends on the type of information collected and on the policy mechanism 
used.  First, consider the issue of the type of information being collected.  The first two rows of 
table 2 report the value of information for each of the indicated scenarios relative to the baseline 
scenario.  Table entries are simply the difference in expected net benefits between the given 
scenario and the baseline scenario.   The benefits of obtaining different types of information 
depend on how the information is used to improve policy.  Essentially, information can be used 
to improve the allocation of controls across producers and/or to alter the overall level of control.  
                                                 
5 In our model the regulator has the ability to perfectly target all firm choices that influence emissions, 
which is the same as choosing emissions directly in the case of deterministic emissions.  Our model differs from 
Weitzman's in terms of the functional forms used as he had quadratic cost and benefit functions while ours are more 
nonlinear   16
For instance, information on fate and transport processes is primarily important for setting the 
correct allocation of controls:  with better information comes improved targeting.  However, the 
benefits of improved targeting will generally only be large if there is a significant amount of 
heterogeneity in transport coefficients across firms.   In our model there is not much 
heterogeneity in transport and so we find a relatively small value of obtaining more information 
about the fate and transport process. 
Abatement cost information is used to improve both the allocation of controls and the 
overall level of control.  But the benefits of improved targeting based on cost information will 
generally only be large if there is significant heterogeneity in abatement costs across firms.  
There is more heterogeneity in costs than there is in transport coefficients, yet the overall level of 
heterogeneity in the Susquehanna River Basin is relatively small.  The result is that, relative to 
transport information, there is a larger value associated with obtaining abatement cost 
information but the value is still not large.  
Finally, damage cost information is used primarily to set the overall level of control.  
This is important information because the presence of damages is the only reason to have 
controls.  As might be expected, the value of obtaining damage cost information is much greater 
than the value of other types of information, and this information is expected to yield 89 percent 
(under quantity controls) to 93 percent (under a price policy) of the expected net benefits that 
might arise if the government was able to obtain perfect information about all uncertain 
variables. 
  Now consider the issue of how the policy mechanism affects the value of information 
collected.  This is presented in the final row (labeled Difference) in Table 2.  Information has 
higher value for the quantity control than for the price control.  For information structures with   17
abatement costs, this result can be explained by the differences in baseline policy performances: 
with compliance costs information, price and quantity mechanisms perform the same; however, 
price mechanism outperforms the quantity one for baseline information scenario.  Hence, 
information collection has smaller effect on the performance of price control.   
 



























14.82 15.03 19.27 23.33  25.75
Price (Jt
*) 18.22  18.36 19.27 24.18  25.75
∆tx  3.40 3.33 0.00 0.85  0.00
 
 
Table 2.  Value of Alternative Information Structures for Alternative Policy Mechanisms 











Pollution fate, abatement 
costs, and damage 
information  (10
6) 
Quantity 0.21  4.45 8.51 10.93
Price 0.14  1.05 5.96 7.53
Difference 0.07  3.40 2.55 3.40
 
 
Conclusions and perspectives for future research 
We examined how imperfect information of various types may influence the performance 
of tax and quantity instruments for water quality protection, and the value of investments to 
improve information for environmental policy design in the Pennsylvania portion of SRB.  The 
analysis shows that for all information structures considered, the input price regulation performs 
better than the input quantity controls.  For both mechanisms, information collection improves 
policy performance, with damage information having the greatest impact.  Information collection 
is crucial when quantity control is used, since the price mechanism performs relatively well even   18
with minimal available information. 
Our results are contingent on the assumptions about the functional forms and probability 
distributions used.  These assumptions might have significant effect on expected policy 
performances and value of information.  For example, [Adams and Crocker 1984] has shown that 
the knowledge about function specifications can have bigger value than the information about 
parameters in the function.  Sensitivity of our results to alternative functional forms and 
distributions will be conducted in future.     
Finally, we did not explicitly model the process of information collection, instead we 
analyzed just extreme cases with “minimal” (baseline) or complete data for each uncertain factor.  
However, in reality, it might be infinitely costly to collect perfect information of any kind, and 
partial information can be more preferable.  Information theory suggests [Lawrence 1998], that 
data should be collected up to the point when marginal cost of information collection equals the 
marginal benefits of information.   
Unfortunately, modeling information collection processes and costs requires much more 
complicated models.  We consider our research as a useful starting point in empirical analysis of 
the link between information collection and environmental policy design, and much more 
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Table A1.  Average Annual Nitrogen Load to the Mouth of Subwatersheds  






Rank based on 
total load 
202 3,499.8 167.1 3,666.9  3
204 5,694.2 3,231.5 8,925.6  1
207 4,314.1 1,142.0 5,456.1  2
214 1,499.1 71.8 1,571.0  7
215 1,980.6 76.5 2,057.1  6
223* 1,492.3 28.6 1,520.9  8
301**  1,367.2 147.9 1,515.1  9
302 1,607.0 726.4 2,333.3  4
401**  1,230.6 74.3 1,304.9  11
402 1,987.1 210.9 2,198.1  5
404* 1,270.9 94.5 1,365.5  10
410* 459.0 68.5 527.4  12
Source: Evans [personal communications] 
* watersheds in italic are dropped from the analysis  
** these two watersheds are combined and modeled as a single watershed 
   25
 
Table A2. Watershed Data used in the analysis 
Watershed/ 
Characteristics 




Crop Land (ha) (li0)  32719.5 43955.6 30550.6 11927.3 7187.0 5781.8  18542.7 9450.2  County crop land from PA Agricultural Statistics 
[USDA and PADA 2003] and watershed area in 
each county from [Abler et al 2002] 
Nitrogen use (Metric 
ton)  (ni0) 
5918.1  9047.  5694.8  2239.2  1413.2  960.7  3275.5  1666.0  County corn production from PA Agricultural 
Statistics [USDA and PADA 2003]; watershed 
area in each county, nitrogen content per bushel of 





















1.4 1.4 1.3 1.7  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.4  Model  calibration  procedure 
Precipitation, 
millimeters (zi) 
817.5  929.7  818.6 1052.7  1052.7 811.6  811.6 811.7  Abler  et al 2002 and Teigen and Singer 1992 
NPS load to the mouth 
of watershed (Metric 
ton) 
3499.8 5694.2 4314.1 1499.2  1980.6  1607.0  2597.8  1987.1  Evans,  personal  communications 
 
 
Table A2.   Descriptions of random variables 
Variable Notation  Distribution  Characteristics  Source 
Own price elasticity of 
nitrogen demand 
εN  Uniform  Mean = - 0.157 
Variance = 0.008 
SD = 0.087 
Hertel 1996, Abebe et. al. 1989, Roberts and Heady 1982, Vroomen and 
Larson 1991    26
Coeff. of Var. = -0.551 
Interval = [-0.307,-0.007] 
Own price elasticity of 
land demand 
εL  Uniform  Mean = - 0.253 
Variance = 0.021 
SD = 0.144 
Coeff. of Var. = -0.569 
Interval = [-0.503,-0.003] 
Hertel 1996, Abebe et. al. 1989, Roberts and Heady 1982, Vroomen and 
Larson 1991  
Cross-price elasticity of 
nitrogen demand 
εNL  Uniform Mean  =  0.147 
Variance = 0.007 
SD = 0.081 
Coeff. of Var. = 0.552 
Interval = [0.007,0.287] 
Hertel 1996, Abebe et. al. 1989, Roberts and Heady 1982, Vroomen and 
Larson 1991  
Price elasticity of land 
supply 
εLS  Uniform Mean  =  0.500 
Variance = 0.080 
SD = 0.283 
Coeff. of Var. = 0.566 
Interval = [0.010,0.990] 
Abler et al 2002 
Transport coefficient for 
watershed 202  
ω1 Normal  Mean  =  0.710 
Variance = 0.110 
SD = 0.332 
Coeff. of Var. = 0.467 
Interval = [0, 1] 
Horan et al 2002b 
Transport coefficient for 
watershed 204 
ω2 Normal  Mean  =  0.730 
Variance = 0.110 
SD = 0.338 
Coeff. of Var. = 0.462 
Interval = [0, 1] 
Horan et al 2002b 
Transport coefficient for 
watershed 207 
ω3 Normal  Mean  =  0.580 
Variance = 0.160 
SD = 0.400 
Coeff. of Var. = 0.688 
Interval = [0, 1] 
Horan et al 2002b 
Transport coefficient for 
watershed 214 
ω4 Normal  Mean  =  0.680 
Variance = 0.130 
SD = 0.355 
Coeff. of Var. = 0.519 
Interval = [0, 1] 
Horan et al 2002b 
Transport coefficient for 
watershed 215 
ω5 Normal  Mean  =  0.630 
Variance = 0.070 
SD = 0.261 
Horan et al 2002b   27
Coeff. of Var. = 0.417 
Interval = [0, 1] 
Transport coefficient for 
watershed 302 
ω6 Normal  Mean  =  0.610 
Variance = 0.070 
SD = 0.265 
Coeff. of Var. = 0.433 
Interval = [0, 1] 
Horan et al 2002b 
Transport coefficient for 
combined watershed 301 
and 401 
ω7 Normal  Mean  =  0.660 
Variance = 0.070 
SD = 0.265 
Coeff. of Var. = 0.401 
Interval = [0, 1] 
Horan et al 2002b 
Transport coefficient for 
watershed 402  
ω8 Normal  Mean  =  0.560 
Variance = 0.140 
SD = 0.370 
Coeff. of Var. = 0.661 
Interval = [0, 1] 
Horan et al 2002b 
Damage coefficient   ψ  Uniform  Mean = 1.895 10
-4  
Variance = 5.334 10
-9 
SD = 7.303 10
-5  
Coeff. of Var. = 0.385 




The range of the possible values for the damage coefficient is selected in 
such a way that the model solutions reproduce the optimal loads defined in 
the Chesapeake Bay agreement and by USGS (40% – 20% load reduction 
from the baseline values; Belval and Sprague 1999, Chesapeake Bay 
Program 2000) 
Damage exponent   τ Uniform  Mean  =  2.005 
Variance = 0.330 
SD = 0.574 
Coeff. of Var. = 0.287 
Interval = [1.01, 3] 
The range for the damage exponent is selected to represent convex 
environmental damage function.   
 
 